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Abstract: This paper proposes a new axiomatic model of intertemporal choice that 
allows for dynamic inconsistency. We weaken the classical assumption of stationarity 
into two related axioms: stationarity in the short-term and stationarity in the long-term. 
We obtain a model with two independent discount factors, which is flexible enough to 
capture different time preferences, including a greater impatience for more immediate 
outcomes (when a long-term discount factor exceeds a compounded short-term discount 
factor). Our proposed model can accommodate some experimental results that cannot 
be rationalized by other existing models of dynamic inconsistency (such as quasi-
hyperbolic discounting and generalized hyperbolic discounting).  
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Intertemporal Choice with Different Short-Term and Long-Term Discount Factors 
Discounted utility (Samuelson, 1937) is the most popular model of intertemporal 
choice. The main behavioral assumption of constant (exponential) discounting is 
stationarity (Koopmans, 1960, postulate 4, p. 294). Yet, empirical evidence suggests that 
decision makers may violate stationarity (e.g., Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992, section II, 
pp. 574-578). Several generalizations of discounted utility were proposed in the 
literature including quasi-hyperbolic discounting (Phelps and Pollak, 1968), generalized 
hyperbolic discounting (Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992), the similarity theory 
(Rubinstein, 2003), subadditive discounting (Scholten and Read, 2010) and liminal 
discounting (Pan et al., 2013). 
This paper proposes a new model of intertemporal choice that allows for dynamic 
inconsistency. Our approach is to weaken the classical assumption of stationarity into two 
related behavioral assumptions: stationarity in the short-term and stationarity in the 
long-term. We obtain a model with two different discount factors. We can think of one of 
them as a long-term discount factor and the other—as a short-term discount factor.  
Intuitively, our proposed model works as follows. Suppose that time periods are 
measured in days and seven days (i.e., one week) constitute one short term period. 
Within each week, a decision maker discounts daily utilities using one (short-term) 
discount factor. This generates weekly utilities. A decision maker then discounts these 
weekly utilities using another (long-term) discount factor. 
A model with two different discount factors is useful in several applied problems. 
For example, consider a customer with a line of credit for a certain time period (e.g., one 
month). The customer must pay a high interest rate if a payment is deferred for a longer 
period. In this case, it is rather natural to assume that the customer distinguishes 
between the short term (within one credit period) and the long term. The customer may 
discount little (or not at all) the time periods falling within one credit period. At the 
same time, the customer may use a lower discount factor in the long term (for time 
periods extending beyond the length of the credit period). 
As another example, consider a taxpayer whose income/revenue is accounted for 
within a certain fiscal period (e.g., one year). The taxpayer may differentiate between 
time periods falling within one fiscal period (the short term) and falling into different 
fiscal periods (the long term). Under progressive taxation, the taxpayer may use a lower 
discount factor in the short term since an increased income/revenue within the current 
fiscal period increases the tax burden. The taxpayer may use a higher discount factor in 
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the long term since income/revenue received in different time periods is taxed with a 
lower tax rate. 
In a related example, consider an organization operating on an annual budget. 
Again, such a decision maker may use one discount factor in the short term (within one 
year) when its approved budget funds are known with certainty. The same organization, 
however, may use a different discount factor in the long term (several years) since the 
availability of budget funds is uncertain/unknown across different budget periods.  
Finally, a model with two discount factors is a useful framework in situations 
where intertemporal impatience is compounded with a certain survival probability. For 
example, a decision maker may use one discount factor in the short term that reflects his 
or her intertemporal impatience. The same decision maker may use another discount 
factor in the long term that reflects his or her perceived survival probability. For 
individuals, this can be the perception of own mortality rate. For firms, this can be the 
estimated probability of remaining on the market. 
In our proposed model, two discount factors are independent of each other. This 
creates a flexible framework for capturing different types of time preferences. 
Specifically, our proposed model can accommodate dynamically consistent preferences 
(when a long-term discount factor coincides with a compounded short-term discount 
factor), a greater impatience for immediate outcomes (when a long-term discount factor 
is greater than a compounded short-term discount factor) and a greater patience, 
possibly even no discounting at all, within a short term period (when a long-term 
discount factor is smaller than a compounded short-term discount factor). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 introduces the 
mathematical notation and our proposed model. Bleichrodt et al. (2008) recently 
provided a behavioral characterization (axiomatization) of the discounted utility model 
of Samuelson (1937). We adopt the framework of Bleichrodt et al. (2008) for 
characterizing the behavioral properties of our proposed model in section 2. Section 3 
compares our proposed model with other generalizations of discounted utility such as 
quasi-hyperbolic discounting (Phelps and Pollak, 1968), generalized hyperbolic 
discounting (Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992), the similarity theory (Rubinstein, 2003) 
and liminal discounting (Pan et al., 2013). Section 4 applies our proposed model to 
several behavioral regularities in intertemporal choice (experiment I reported in 
Rubinstein (2003) and the common difference effect of Loewenstein and Prelec (1992)). 
Section 5 concludes.  
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1. Notation and the model 
There is a connected and separable set X.  The elements of X  are called outcomes. 
An outcome can be a monetary payoff, a consumption bundle, a financial portfolio, a 
health state etc. A program is an infinite sequence of outcomes { } 1t tx ∞= , where xt∊X  is an 
outcome received in time period t∊ℕ. The set of all programs is denoted by ℙ.  
For a compact notation let yTp∊ℙ denote a program that yields outcomes {y1, y2, …, 
yT}∊XT  in the first T  periods, for some T∊ℕ and the same outcome as program p∊ℙ in all 
subsequent periods t >T. An ultimately constant  program yTc∊ℙ yields outcomes {y1, y2, 
…, yT}∊XT  in the first T  periods and the same outcome xt =c  for all t >T, c ∊X. A constant  
program that yields the same outcome c ∊X  in all periods is denoted by c ∊ℙ. 
A decision maker has a preference relation  ≽ on ℙ. As usual, the symmetric part of 
≽ is denoted by ∼ and the asymmetric part of ≽ is denoted by ≻. The preference relation 
≽ is represented by a function U:ℙ →ℝ if p≽q implies U(p )≥ U(q ) and vice versa for all 
p, q ∊ℙ. We consider utility function (1). 
(1)     { }( ) ( )( )1 1 11
1 1
T
t
t t Tt
t
U x u xτ τ
τ
δ β
∞
∞
− −
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= =
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In formula (1), a standard utility function u :X →ℝ  is continuous, bounded, non-constant 
on X  and determined up to an increasing linear transformation. Discount factors δ∊(0,1) 
and β>0 are unique and T∊ℕ denotes the number of time periods in the short term. 
If T=1 then utility function (1) becomes a conventional discounted utility with one 
constant discount factor: { }( ) ( )11
1
t
t tt
t
U x u xδ
∞
∞
−
=
=
=∑ . Thus, we can interpret discount factor 
δ∊(0,1) as a standard (long-term) discount factor. According to formula (1), utility of 
outcomes in the first T∊ℕ periods is ( ) ( ) ( )11 2 ... T Tu x u x u xβ β −+ ⋅ + + ⋅ . Thus, we can 
interpret discount factor β>0 as a short-term discount factor. 
If δ = β T  then the short-term discount factor is consistent with the long-term 
discount factor and a decision maker behaves as if maximizing a standard discounted 
utility (with one constant discount factor). If δ > β T  then a decision maker exhibits 
greater impatience for the immediate outcomes in the short term (i.e., he or she is more 
patient in the long term). Finally, if δ < β T  then a decision maker is more patient in the 
short term. In fact, model (1) allows for the possibility that a decision maker does not 
discount outcomes within the first T  periods (β =1). 
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Figure 1 One unit of utility received in period t ∊{1, 2, …,100} evaluated according to (1) 
for different values of the long-term discount factor δ∊[0.8,0.99] and a fixed short-term 
discount factor β=0.99 as well as a fixed length of the short term period T=10. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates model (1). Figure 1 plots the present value of one unit of utility 
received in period t ∊{1, 2, …,100} when it is evaluated by formula (1). We fixed the 
short-term discount factor β=0.99 and the length of the short term period T=10 but 
allowed for a varying long-term discount factor in the range [0.8,0.99]. When the long-
term discount factor is δ*=0.9910≅0.904 then the future units of utility are evaluated by 
standard discounted utility with a constant discount factor β=0.99. When the long-term 
discount factor is greater than δ* a decision maker exhibits greater impatience in the 
short term (at any point in time the slope of the surface on figure 1 is steeper than the 
slope of its asymptotic trend). When the long-term discount factor is smaller than δ* a 
decision maker exhibits greater impatience in the long term (the slope of the asymptotic 
trend of the surface on figure 1 is steeper than the slope of the surface at any point in 
time).  
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2. Behavioral Characterization 
Our behavioral characterization of model (1) is similar to the axiomatization of 
discounted utility by Bleichrodt et al. (2008).  
Axiom 1 (Completeness) For all p, q ∊ℙ  either p≽q  or q≽p  (or both). 
Axiom 2 (Transitivity) For all p, q, r ∊ℙ  if p≽q  and q≽r  then p≽r. 
Axiom 3 (First Period Sensitivity) There exist p∊ℙ and x, y∊X  such that x1p≻y1p. 
Axiom 4 (Independence) For all p, q ∊ℙ, t∊ℕ and x, y∊Xt  we have xtp≽ytp  if and 
only if xtq≽ytq. 
Axiom 5 (Long-Term Stationarity) There exists T∊ℕ such that yTp≽yTq  if and only 
if p≽q  for all p, q ∊ℙ and y∊XT. 
Axiom 6 (Ultimate Continuity) For any ultimately constant program yTc∊ℙ  the sets 
{(z1, … , zT)∊XT : yTc ≽zTc } and   {(z1, … , zT)∊XT : zTc ≽yTc } are closed with respect to the 
product topology on XT. 
Axiom 7 (Constant-Equivalence) For all p∊ℙ there exists c ∊X  such that p ∼c. 
Axiom 8 (Tail-Robustness) For all p∊ℙ and c ∊X  such that p ≻c  (c ≻p) there exist 
t∊ℕ such that pTc≻c  (c ≻pTc) for all T≥t. 
Axioms 1-4 are standard. Axioms 1 and 2 are necessary for any real-valued 
representation. Axiom 3 rules out a degenerate case when a decision maker does not 
care about the present outcome. Axiom 4 is required for intertemporal separability of 
utility. Axiom 4 may be replaced with an axiom known as the Thomsen-Blaschke 
condition (Debreu, 1960, p.18, Assumption 1.3) or double cancelation (Kranz et al. 1971, 
section 6.2.1., p. 250, Definition 3). 
Next, we weaken the classical axiom of stationarity to axiom 5, which we call long-
term stationarity. Axiom 5 states that whenever two programs yield the same outcomes 
in the first T  periods, T∊ℕ, then a decision maker reveals the same preference between 
these programs in periods one and T+1. In other words, a common consumption vector 
can be dropped altogether without affecting the preferences of a decision maker. By 
iteration, this implies that whenever two programs yield the same outcomes in the first 
nT  periods, n∊ℕ, then these outcomes do not affect the preference relation (and they 
can be disregarded). Axiom 5 becomes the standard stationarity condition when T=1. 
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Axioms 6-8 are standard. Axiom 6 is required to derive utility representation for 
ultimately constant programs. Alternatively, axiom 6 may be replaced with solvability 
and Archimedean axioms. 1 Axioms 7 and 8 are required for extending any utility  
representation from ultimately constant programs to all programs. 
Proposition 1  The preference relation ≽ satisfies axioms 1-8 if and only if it admits 
representation (2), where utility function v :XT →ℝ  is continuous, bounded and 
determined up to an increasing linear transformation, discount factor δ∊(0,1) is unique 
and T∊ℕ. 
(2)    { }( ) ( ) ( )( )1 1 1 1 21
1
, ,...,
t
t t Tt T t Tt
t
U x v x x xδ
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∞
−
⋅
− ⋅ + − ⋅ +=
=
=∑  
The proof is analogous to the proof of theorem 2 in Bleichrodt et al. (2008, p.343). 
Representation (2) becomes standard discounted utility (with a constant discount 
factor) when T=1. When T>1 we need an additional behavioral assumption to 
characterize function v :XT →ℝ. 
Let {xy}Tp  denote a program that yields an outcome x∊X  in the first period, and 
outcomes y≡{y1, y2, …, yT-1}∊XT-1 in periods 2, 3,… T  for someT∊ℕ, and the same 
outcome as program p∊ℙ in all subsequent periods t >T. Similarly, let {yx}Tp  denote a 
program that yields outcomes {y1,y2, …, yT-1}∊XT-1 in periods 1,2,… T-1 and an outcome 
x∊X  in period T, and the same outcome as program p∊ℙ in all subsequent periods t >T. 
With this notation we can state our last behavioral assumption.  
Axiom 9 (Short-Term Stationarity) For all p∊ℙ, y,z∊XT-1 and x∊X   we have 
{xy}Tp≽{xz}Tp  if and only if {yx}Tp≽{zx}Tp . 
Axiom 9 can be interpreted as a classical stationarity condition for a limited time 
period T∊ℕ.2 Therefore, we refer to axiom 9 as a short-term stationarity. According to 
axiom 9, if two programs yield the same outcome in the first period then the decision 
maker’s preference between them is not affected by dropping this common outcome and 
advancing the subsequent T-1 outcomes by one period. Axiom 9 holds trivially if T=1. 
Note that period T  in axiom 9 is the same as period T  in axiom 5. 
Proposition 2  The preference relation ≽ satisfies axioms 1-9 if and only if it admits 
representation (1). 
The proof is presented in the appendix. 
                                                          
1
 See Blavatskyy (2013, section 3) for details in the context of choice under uncertainty. 
2
 Conversely, a classical stationarity is the limiting case of axiom 9 when T→∞. 
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3. Comparison with other models 
Quasi-hyperbolic discounting (Phelps and Pollak, 1968) models dynamic 
inconsistency by introducing the present bias. Specifically, the classical stationarity 
condition is assumed to hold starting from the second (rather than the first) period. 
Thus, quasi-hyperbolic discounting coincides with standard discounted utility from the 
second period onwards. In terms of our proposed model, we can think of quasi-
hyperbolic discounting as a model with an initial short-term period of length T=2 and a 
degenerate short-term period of length T=1 afterwards.  
Loewenstein and Prelec (1992, p. 580, equation 15) proposed to discount the 
future units of utility using the functional form of a generalized hyperbola. This 
functional form departs from constant (exponential) discounting so that the periods in 
the immediate future are relatively more heavily discounted (cf. figure I in Loewenstein 
and Prelec, 1992, p. 581). Thus, the qualitative difference between model (1) and the 
model of Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) is the following. Model (1) allows for a long-
term discount factor to differ from the short-term discount factor (not only in the near 
future but also in the distant future periods). The model of Loewenstein and Prelec 
(1992) can be interpreted as a model with an increasing long-term discount factor. 
The similarity theory (Rubinstein, 2003, p.1210) postulates that a decision maker 
first applies the monotonicity axiom—a decision maker chooses the program that yields 
better outcomes in all periods. Otherwise, when there is an intertemporal tradeoff, a 
decision maker attempts to simplify programs—if one program is similar to a program 
that monotonically dominates the other then it is chosen. Finally, if none of the programs 
even seemingly dominates the other, “the choice is made using a different criterion”. 
Somewhat unexpectedly, model (1) can generate alike behavior as the similarity theory. 
Model (1) satisfies the monotonicity axiom. When the short-term discount factor is in 
the small neighborhood of one, model (1) effectively aggregates outcomes in the short 
term without much discounting. In this case, a decision maker behaves as if an outcome 
received in time t1 is “similar” to the same outcome received in time t2 when t1 and t2 
belong to the same short term period; but the decision maker would consider these 
outcomes “dissimilar” when t1 and t2 belong to different short term periods. 
Similar to the model presented in this paper, the model of liminal discounting (Pan 
et al., 2013) also employs two discount factors. A liminal discounter uses one discount 
factor for outcomes received up to a certain time period in the future and the other 
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discount factor—for outcomes received in all subsequent time periods. In contrast, 
model (1) employs one discount factor for outcomes received within one short-term 
period and the other discount factor—for outcomes received in different short-term 
periods.  
4. Examples 
Example 1 (Experiment I reported in Rubinstein, 2003, section 3.1, p.1211)  
In the first question, the majority of subjects prefer receiving $607.07 on 
17.06.2005 instead of receiving $467 on 17.06.2004. In the second question, the 
majority of subjects prefer receiving $467 on 16.06.2005 instead of receiving $467.39 on 
17.06.2005. This majority choice is inconsistent with classical discounted utility (with a 
constant discount factor), quasi-hyperbolic discounting and generalized hyperbolic 
discounting (Rubinstein, 2003, p. 1212). 
Let us now analyze this example with model (1). Let one time period to be one day. 
If 16.06.2005 and 17.06.2005 happen to be in the same short term period, then the 
majority choice in the second question implies inequality (3). 
(3)     ( ) ( )$467 $467.39u uβ>  
If 16.06.2005 and 17.06.2005 happen to be in different short term periods, then the 
majority choice in the second question implies inequality (4). 
(4)     ( ) ( )1 $467 $467.39T u uβ δ− >  
Let N∊ℕ be the highest integer number not exceeding 365/T.  The majority choice 
in the first question then implies inequality (5). 
(5)            ( ) ( )365 $607.07 $467N NT u uδ β − >  
If T>1 then model (1) can rationalize the majority choice in example 1. For 
instance, let T=5 (so that N=73) and let utility function be linear. Inequality (3) then 
implies an upper bound on the short-term discount factor β<0.999166. On the other 
hand, inequality (5) implies a lower bound on the long-term discount factor 
δ>0.996413. Thus, if the short-term discount factor is sufficiently low and the long-term 
discount factor is sufficiently high, inequalities (3) and (5) can hold simultaneously.  
Inequalities (4) and (5) can also hold simultaneously. We already established that 
(5) implies δ>0.996413. Given this result, inequality (4) implies a lower bound on the 
short-term discount factor β>0.999310. Thus, (4) and (5) can hold at the same time. 
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Example 2 The common difference effect (Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992, p. 574)  
A decision maker chooses outcome x  today over outcome y  tomorrow but prefers 
to receive outcome y  in time period t+1 rather than outcome x  in time period t  for 
some t∊ℕ. If T=1 then model (1) becomes classical discounted utility with a constant 
discount factor and it cannot rationalize such a choice pattern. If T>1 then choosing 
outcome x  today over outcome y  tomorrow implies inequality (6). 
(6)                  ( ) ( )u x u yβ>  
If t  and t+1 happen to be in the same short term period then choosing outcome y  
in time t+1 rather than outcome x  in time t  implies inequality (6) with a reversed sign. 
In this case, model (1) cannot rationalize the common difference effect. Yet, if t  and t+1 
are in different short term periods, choosing outcome y  in time t+1 rather than 
outcome x  in time t  implies inequality (7). 
(7)                  ( ) ( )1Tu y u xδ β −>  
Inequalities (6) and (7) can hold simultaneously if δ > β T. Thus, model (1) can 
rationalize the common difference effect if t  and t+1 are in different short term periods 
and a decision maker exhibits greater impatience in the short term (δ > β T). 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper presents a new model of intertemporal choice. The model allows a 
short-term discount factor to be different from the long-term discount factor. The model 
has a natural application in situations when intertemporal choice in the short term is 
qualitatively different from intertemporal choice in the long term (for example, due to 
an accounting practice, progressive taxation, a credit period etc.)  
The main advantage of the new model is parsimony. Compared to the classical 
discounted utility, our proposed model has only two additional parameters—a short-
term interest rate and the length of the short term period. Compared to the popular 
quasi-hyperbolic discounting, our proposed model has only one additional parameter—
the length of the short term period. 
Our proposed model is flexible in capturing different time preferences (cf. figure 
1). In particular, it allows for greater impatience in the short-term as well as greater 
impatience in the long-term.  
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The model has two different discount factors. This may have several possible 
interpretations. For example, we can view a short-term discount factor β  as a standard 
coefficient of intertemporal impatience (converting the desirability of outcomes across 
time periods). At the same time, we can think of a long-term discount factor δ  as a 
“survival probability” that a decision maker remains in a position to take decisions after 
T  time periods. 
We provide a behavioral characterization of the new model. The model is derived 
by breaking the standard stationarity assumption into two related assumptions: 
stationarity in the long term and in the short term (axioms 5 and 9). Thus, arguably, the 
model has an intuitive appeal. 
The model can accommodate some experimental results that cannot be 
rationalized by other existing models such as quasi-hyperbolic discounting and 
generalized hyperbolic discounting (example 1). Yet, there are some experimental 
results that contradict our model. For example, our proposed model, like any model with 
a time-invariant utility function, cannot accommodate the absolute magnitude effect 
(Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992, p. 575). Also, our model, like any model built on the 
consequentialist premise, cannot accommodate any framing effects such as the delay-
speedup asymmetry (Loewenstein, 1988). 
The model presented in this paper allows for two different discount factors. Such a 
model can be further extended to allow for three (or more) different discount factors 
(e.g., in short term, medium term and long term). In fact, a model with three discount 
factors fits naturally into our system of time measurement (in days, months and years). 
Our proposed model introduces a distinction between discounting in the short and 
long term. In contrast, the popular quasi-hyperbolic discounting model differentiates 
between discounting in the current and subsequent periods. We can approximate quasi-
hyperbolic discounting within our proposed model by using a short term period of 
length T=2 and restricting a long-term discount factor to be greater than a short-term 
discount factor. 
In case when the long-term discount factor is greater then a compounded short-
term discount factor (δ > β T-1) our proposed model implies that a decision maker may 
prefer to receive the same outcome later (e.g. at time period T+1) rather than sooner 
(e.g.  at time period T). Discounted utility and all its generalizations, except for the 
model of Blavatskyy (2015), can imply a similar preference for a delayed outcome. For 
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illustration, let us consider the following example from Blavatskyy (2015). A decision 
maker who receives two million now obtains utility u($2m), where u(.) is a concave 
utility function. The same decision maker who receives one million now as well as one 
million dollars at a later moment of time t  obtains utility u($1m)+D(t)u($1m), where 
D(t) is a discount function such that D(t) converges to 1 when time period t  is 
sufficiently close to the present (cf.  Figure 1 in Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992, p. 581). 
Thus, when time period t  is sufficiently close to the present,  a decision maker with a 
concave utility function prefers to receive one million at a later time period t (utility 
u($1m)+D(t)u($1m) converges to 2*u($1m), which is greater than u($2m) due to 
Jensen’s inequality). 
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Appendix 
Proof of proposition 2  
It is relatively straightforward to show the necessity of axioms 1-9. We prove only 
their sufficiency. If axioms 1-8 hold then preferences admit representation (2) due to 
proposition 1. Moreover, if axioms 1, 2, 4 and 6 hold then utility function v :XT →ℝ in (2)  
is separable so that we can write 
(8)     ( ) ( )1 2
1
, ,...,
T
Tv x x x u xτ τ
τ =
=∑  
where utility functions uτ :X →ℝ are continuous and unique up to a positive affine 
transformation for all τ∊{1,…,T}.  
If axiom 9 holds then any standard sequence of outcomes is invariant across time 
periods (see Kranz et al. (1971), section 6.11.2, p.305) so that utility functions uτ :X →ℝ 
are identical expect for a multiplication by a positive constant. If axiom 3 holds then the 
constant associated with utility function in the first period cannot be zero and we can 
divide all utility functions by this constant to obtain 
(9)    ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1
2
, , ...,
T
Tv x x x u x a u xτ τ
τ =
= + ⋅∑  
where utility function u :X →ℝ is continuous and unique up to a positive affine 
transformation and aτ>0 for all τ∊{1,…,T}. Let us set β=a2. If T=2 then we immediately 
obtain (1).  
If T≥3 then for any x,y∊X,  we can construct a program that yields y  in one period 
τ∊{2,…,T} and x—in all other periods. We can also find an outcome z∊X  such that a 
decision maker is indifferent between this program and a program that yields z in 
period τ+1 and x—in all other periods. Thus, we have  
(10)    ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1a u y u x a u z u xτ τ +⋅ − = ⋅ −        
If axiom 9 holds, then a decision maker is also indifferent between a program that 
yields y in period τ-1 (and x—in all other periods) and a program that yields z in period 
τ (and x—in all other periods). Thus, we also have 
(11)    ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1a u y u x a u z u xτ τ− ⋅ − = ⋅ −        
Multiplying both sides of (21) with aτ  and using (20) we obtain 21 1a a aτ τ τ+ −= . 
Solving by iteration we obtain aτ=βτ-1  for all τ ∊{2,…,T}. Plugging this result into formula 
(19) and formula (19)—into (2) yields representation (1). Q.E.D. 
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